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An overview of the
Constitutional Court
hearing of the inner-city
evictions case
under the NBRA to prevent unsafe
conditions in light of the City’s consti-
tutional obligation to provide access
to adequate housing.
On the other hand, the respond-
ents cross-appealed against the
High Court’s failure to hold that the
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from
and Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act of 1998 (PIE) was applicable to
the evictions in issue and that section
12 of the NBRA was inconsistent with
section 26 of the Constitution.
In what appeared to be turning
the clock back in socio-economic
rights jurisprudence, the SCA criti-
cised the High Court for ordering the
adoption and implementation of a
housing programme. According to the
SCA:
[T]he High Court had insufficient
regard to the division of power. It is
for the democratically elected gov-
ernment of the City to determine
what its vision of the inner city is.
Courts are not equipped or entitled
to second-guess this type of policy
decision. The Court also failed to
have regard to the constitutional
limitation on the right of access to
adequate housing. In particular it
took no account of the uncontra-
dicted evidence of the City that it
did not have the means to provide
the respondents with inner city ac-
commodation.
According to the SCA, it is not correct
to state that persons in desperate situ-
ations may not be evicted unless al-
ternative or adequate housing is pro-
vided. “The corollary would be that to
deny someone poisoned food is to
deny that person food” (para 46).
However, the SCA held that an
eviction, at the very least, triggers an
obligation on the City to provide
emergency and basic shelter. Never-
theless, the SCA found that the obli-
gation on the occupiers to comply
with the order arising from the NBRA
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On 28 August 2007, the Constitutional Court heard anappeal against the decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal (SCA) in the Rand Properties case. This case concerns
the eviction of poor people from dilapidated buildings in the
inner city of Johannesburg. Acting in terms of section 12 of the
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act of
1977 (NBRA), the City of Johannesburg (the City) had issued
eviction notices on the basis that these buildings were haz-
ardous and not suitable for human habitation. It therefore
brought an application to the High Court to enforce these
notices.
The High Court found that the
City’s housing programme failed to
comply with the Constitution by not
attending to the housing needs of
those “in a crisis situation or otherwise
in desperate need of accommoda-
tion”. It directed the City “to devise
and implement within its available re-
sources a comprehensive … pro-
gramme to progressively realise the
right to adequate housing to people
living in the inner city”. The City was
thus interdicted from “evicting or
seeking to evict the … respondents”
until it complied with its constitutional
obligations. The City appealed
against the High Court judgment to
the SCA.
The Supreme Court of
Appeal
The main argument of the City in the
SCA was that the High Court had
misinterpreted the City’s obligation











notice was not dependent upon their
being provided with alternative ac-
commodation “even if the effect of
complying with the order will be that
they are left without access to ad-
equate housing” (para 68).
It rejected the submission that sec-
tion 12 of the NBRA has to be read
subject to PIE, holding that PIE does
not apply to evictions arising from a
section 12 notice. Once such notice
is issued, the SCA reasoned, the con-
tinued occupation of the property
becomes an offence and a court is
not entitled to uphold such unlawful
act. In the SCA’s opinion, PIE cannot
be used to prevent illegal conduct:
“PIE must be seen in light of its history
and purpose, which is to resolve a
clash between proprietary rights and
the plight of the poor” (para 58).
The SCA noted that the respond-
ents did not fit the description of “un-
lawful occupier” in PIE, which is
someone who occupies property
without the “express or tacit consent
of the owner or without any right in
law”.
According to the SCA, the build-
ings in issue had been abandoned
by their rightful owners. This conduct
amounted to tacit consent to any-
body to occupy the buildings.
The SCA recognised the potential
overlap between PIE and the NBRA,
arising from section 6 of PIE, which
permits an organ of state to apply for
an eviction “where it is in the public
interest”, which includes health and
safety objectives. It noted, however,
that section 6 differed from section 4
of PIE to the extent that section 6 did
not contain the qualification “notwith-
standing anything to the contrary
contained in any law or the common
law”. According to the SCA, “[t]his
means that section 6 recognises that
PIE is not the exclusive statutory
mechanism in terms of which persons
may be evicted at the behest of or-
gans of state” (para 60).
The SCA noted, though, that the
NBRA was not without constraints: the
notice must be based on necessity on
the ground of the safety of persons
and the decision to issue the notice
must be rational. Thus, according to
the SCA, if reasonable alternatives
are available, they have to be ex-
plored and adopted. However, it
noted that, in this case, the buildings
could not be made safe (para 52).
It also declined to review the sec-
tion 12 notice on the ground that the
respondents had not been heard in
accordance with the provisions of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act of 2000 (PAJA). It held that PAJA
was not applicable. (For a fuller dis-
cussion on the findings of the SCA
decision and their implications for ad-
ministrative law, see Quinot, 2007)
The SCA also dismissed the re-
quest for a structural interdict to en-




It held that “the
City is not obliged to
provide housing for
the poor in the inner
city specifically”. It
added that “[w]here
housing is to be pro-
vided for any particu-
lar economic group is
a matter that lies within the province
of the policy-making functions of the
City” (para 75).
Notwithstanding this holding, the
SCA held that the City had an obli-
gation towards those who might be
left without any shelter as a result of
the eviction and who had no re-
sources to get any such shelter. Such
persons had to be provided, at least,
with temporary shelter “to alleviate
the desperate plight in which they will
find themselves” (para 76).
Consequent to this finding, the
SCA upheld the City’s appeal. The
respondents were interdicted from
occupying the property concerned
and were given one month to vacate,
failing which the sheriff was author-
ised to remove them from the prop-
erty. Conversely, the City was or-
dered to relocate those respondents
who were to be evicted and rendered
desperately in need of housing as-
sistance to a temporary settlement
area in accordance with the Na-
tional Housing Code.
In addition, the City was ordered
to open, within seven days, a register
of persons who qualified for such
relocation and to file, within four months,
a compliance affidavit, which had to
be served on the respondents’ attor-
neys and amici (ie the Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions and the
Community Law Centre at the Uni-







the decision of the SCA
to the Constitutional
Court. I will deal with
the grounds of appeal
and arguments thereof
as presented by the applicants col-




The applicants’ grounds of appeal
opposed both factual and legal find-
ings of the SCA. On factual findings,
they contended that the SCA had
erred in finding that they (the appli-
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cants) demanded less than accom-
modation in the inner city and that
the buildings in issue were filled with
waste and sewer water, as well as
faeces and refuse. They also chal-
lenged the finding that
the City had given incon-
trovertible evidence that
it did not have the
means to provide the re-
spondents with accom-
modation in the inner
city.
On legal findings, the
applicants contended
that the SCA had erred
in finding that the issue of
the constitutional duty of
organs of state towards
those who have been
evicted from their homes
in desperate conditions was periph-
eral to the main issue in this case.
They argued that, instead, the SCA
should have found that to deprive a
person of unsafe housing where such
person has nowhere safer to go vio-
lated such a person’s constitutional
right of access to adequate housing.
Thus, evicting such persons in terms of
section 12 of the NBRA violated the
constitutional protection against ar-
bitrary eviction and the right to hu-
man dignity.
The applicants also argued that
the NBRA notice violated section
26(3) of the Constitution since the
notice could be issued without a law-
ful order. According to the applicants,
PIE should apply after the notice has
been issued and the applicants
refuse to vacate the property (in
which case they become illegal oc-
cupiers). Furthermore, the absence of
a criterion guiding the issuance of
such notice renders the NBRA arbi-
trary and in violation of section 26(3)
of the Constitution.
It was also argued that the City
had the obligation to afford all af-
fected persons a hearing before issu-
ing the notice and to consider the




In response to the
arguments of the ap-
plicants, the City con-
tended, amongst
other things, that it





The exercise of these
powers, the City
opined, was not con-
ditional on the fulfilment of its obliga-
tions in section 26 of the Constitution.
It also argued that, even if section
26(3) was applicable, the considera-
tion of relevant circumstances con-
templated by the section could in-
clude whether the buildings from
which the people will be evicted
were unsafe as demanded by the
NBRA.
The City also sought to confirm the
findings of the SCA that PIE was not
applicable to NBRA-based evictions.
It claimed that “[t]he question is
whether an owner who abandons
his or her property to the world ...
should meaningfully be said to give
‘tacit consent’ to whoever happens to
possess such property” (Heads of
argument, para 87).
It also maintained that PIE was
not applicable to the matter because
the eviction at hand was an emer-
gency one intended to avert a health
danger to the occupants and the vi-
cinity. It argued: “It simply cannot be
the law that the provisions of the
health and safety laws apply to those
who occupy property lawfully but
not to those who are in occupation
against the wishes of the owner”
(para 102).
While the City conceded that the
exercise of the powers under the
NBRA constituted administrative ac-
tion within the meaning of PAJA, the
implementation of a programme to
realise the right of access to ad-
equate housing was not. According to
the City, conduct of this nature
“moves more closely on the legisla-
tive and executive than the adminis-
trative sphere” (para 67).
From a more normative perspec-
tive of the right of access to ad-
equate housing, the City argued that
this right is only realisable progres-
sively as a collective and not indi-
vidual right. It cannot be used by an
individual to assert immunity against
a specific exercise of state power.
Contentions of the amici
While canvassing some of the argu-
ments of the applicants, the amici
stressed the fact that the case con-
cerned a systemic problem. They
argued: “The case should be seen in
the context of the pervasive problems
of poverty and homelessness” (Heads
of argument, para 2).
The amici recognised the City’s
duty to ensure that conditions of ac-
commodation did not constitute a
threat to safety. However, they con-
tended that the City should carry out
those duties in a manner that did not
violate the Constitution (para 7).
They argued that section 26 of the
Constitution obliged the state “both to
refrain from taking action which im-
pairs access to housing, and to take
positive measures to assist people in
securing adequate housing” (para
18).
In the opinion of the amici, if the























dered persons homeless, such home-
lessness was a consequence of the
City’s failure to carry out its constitu-
tional obligations (para 33). Like the
applicants, the amici argued that the
SCA should have found that this
matter was a clear case in which an
interdict against eviction and struc-
tural relief were appropriate. Ac-
cording to the amici, at the very least,
the Constitutional Court should re-
quire the City to publish in the media




In a dramatic turn of events, on the
eve of the Constitutional Court hear-
ing, the City filed additional evidence
describing an ongoing process to
adopt an Inner City Regeneration
Charter (the Charter). It pleaded that
the City, in conjunction with several
partners and stakeholders, was de-
veloping an inner-city housing plan
that would ensure that at least
50 000 (and ideally 75 000) new
units were constructed in or near the
inner city by 2015. It projected that
20 000 of these units would be af-
fordable to households in lower in-
come bands, such as the evictees in
this case.
The additional evidence also
averred that the City was committed
to developing a housing plan that
provided a wide range of options,
including shelter for the homeless and
other special groups in need; emer-
gency accommodation; transitional
accommodation; affordable rental
or social housing at various income
levels; inclusionary housing done on
the basis of creative partnerships
between the public and private sec-
tor; and continued delivery of both
medium- and high-income rental and
ownership options.
The City also stated that it would
make at least 500 beds and other
decent facilities available for emer-
gency accommodation and use in
the inner city by 2007. Indeed, at the
hearing, the City indicated that this
accommodation was already avail-
able. It also informed the Court of
seven buildings being prepared for
emergency accommodation within
the inner city.
The additional evidence was also
led to demonstrate that funds had
been allocated to provide housing.
According to the City, 6% of the cur-
rent year’s operating budget was al-
located to housing.
The additional evidence marks a
dramatic shift by the City from being
indifferent towards the applicants
and similarly situated people to rec-
ognising that there is a housing prob-
lem within the City that needs atten-
tion. In spite of this shift, the process
of adopting a housing plan is only
prospective. A lot still has to be done,
not only to finalise the
adoption of the plan,








and the City’s change
of attitude. Nevertheless, some con-
cerns were raised regarding the pro-
posed plan as well as the current po-
sition of the applicants. The
additional evidence did not ad-
equately illustrate the budgetary al-
location and its applicability to hous-
ing. It was, for instance, pointed out
that the additional evidence did not
account for approximately R800
million allocated to housing.
During the hearing, the Court also
grappled with the issue of whether the
applicants were entitled to some
form of interim relief pending its deci-
sion, given that the City had discontin-
ued such services as water and refuse
collection and nothing had been
done to make the properties less haz-
ardous and more hygienic.
The interim order
At the end of the hearing, the Court
reserved judgment. However, two
days after the hearing, the Court is-
sued an interim order in which it di-
rected the parties to consider resolv-
ing the matter amicably, in order to
alleviate the plight of the applicants
by making the buildings as safe and as
conducive to health as reasonably
practicable.
However, the order was disap-
pointing in that it did not expressly
direct the respondents to restore the
basic services discontinued by the
City and improve the hygiene of the
properties.
Conclusion
One can deduce from
the interim order that
the Court was more
comfortable dealing
with the wider implica-
tions of the case in a
way that benefited all
persons in the appli-
cants’ position. The
Court has always been cautious in re-
solving socio-economic rights claims
involving specific individuals. On
many occassions, it has avoided
granting individual remedies to the liti-
gants before it.
In the Government of the Repub-
lic of South Africa and Others v
Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC), for instance, the case be-
tween the parties was settled through
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an interlocutory process, and the fi-
nal judgment of the Court defined
the general obligations of the state
and not those towards respondents
who were living in desperate condi-
tions. It appears, therefore, as if the
Court adopted the same approach
in the present case.
It is, however, too early to deter-
mine whether the settlement pro-
posed by the Court will be concluded
to the satisfaction of all the parties.
Christopher Mbazira is a
researcher in the Socio-Economic
Rights Project.
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The justiciability of the
right to adequate housing
European Roma Rights
Centre v Bulgaria, Collective
Complaint 31/2005
Claud Cahn and Savelina Danova-Russinova
On 30 November 2006, in the abovementioned case,the European Committee of Social Rights (the Commit-
tee) found Bulgaria to be in violation of article 16 (right to
family protection) read together with article E (non-discrimina-
tion clause) of the Revised European Social Charter of 1996
(the Revised Charter). It held that Bulgaria had failed to
secure the right of the Roma, a minority group in the country,
to adequate housing.
The decision has a number of far-
reaching implications for policy and
law in Bulgaria, and for the develop-
ment of the right to adequate hous-
ing and anti-discrimination law.
The facts
Article 31 of the Revised Charter
guarantees a “right to housing”. How-
ever, Bulgaria has not accepted this
provision. It has, however, accepted
article 16, which recognises the right
to economic, legal and social protec-
tion of the family, including provision
of family housing.
In previous decisions, the Com-
mittee, which monitors the imple-
mentation of the European Social
Charter (the Charter), accepted
arguments that the right to family
protection in article 16 of the original
Charter incorporated the right to ad-
equate housing guaranteed in article
11 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) (see European Roma Rights
Centre v Greece, 2005).
In April 2005, the European
Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) brought a
collective complaint against Bul-
garia, alleging a wide range of sys-
temic violations of the right to ad-
equate housing by the state. Several
Bulgarian NGOs were also involved
in the complaint, including the Bul-
garian Helsinki Committee, the Hu-
man Rights Project, the Romani Baxt
Foundation and the Equal Opportu-
nities Initiative Association.
The complaint alleged that tens of
thousands of Roma people were
dwelling in substandard slum settle-
ments, in most cases residing without
adequate security of tenure and,
therefore, under permanent threat of
forced eviction. Despite ample evi-
